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The article aims to provide an extended reflection on Michael Howard’s (former
Leader of the British Conservative Party) 2005 pre-election speech on immigra-
tion, in order to expose the violence and ethical corruption embedded within the
political discourse and policies of immigration in Britain and elsewhere. It does
so by referring to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy regarding figures of immanentism
which, in the case of immigration control, function through the will to absolute
separation, technicism and the notion of mythical collective identity. As a
response to this problem of immanentism, the ethico-political thinking of Levinas
and Derrida is invoked in an attempt to stress upon the necessity of a politics of
generosity founded on ethical hospitality and total exposure to alterity rather
than self-enclosure and fear of otherness.
Firm immigration controls are essential for good community relations. They are
vital for the management of public services. And they are critical for the main-
tenance of national security. That’s why a Conservative Government will set an
annual maximum limit to immigration. (Howard 2005)
Measure is the name for the propriety of one Being to another, or to itself. (Nancy
2000, p. 177)
In recent years, the issue of immigration has pervaded contemporary political
imaginary laying bare the other face of globalisation, the other logic of capital-
ism, and exposing the existential uncertainty that millions of people are facing
today. Yet the political responses to the issue of immigration seem to rest merely
upon the immanentist1 vision of what Nancy (1991) calls ‘absolute enclosure’
manifested, for example, in the politics of borders and figures of measurement
in which quotas and numbers are becoming metaphors for dignity and worth.
Such responses attest to the policies of exclusion that the majority of Western
courtiers are wholeheartedly embracing through what Zylinska (2004, p. 523)
terms ‘the biopolitics of immigration’, producing taxonomies in which ‘singular
beings’ are turned into classified categories such as the ‘illegal immigrant’, the
‘asylum seeker’, the ‘refugee’, the ‘bogus’, the ‘detainee’, the ‘deportee’ and
1. Throughout this essay, I shall use Nancy’s term ‘immanentism’ as a substitute for ‘totalitarianism’
in the sense that it is wider than the categorisation of a type of state or government.
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so forth. These categories, whilst represented in most Western political
discourses as emblematic realities of ‘undemocratic’, ‘anti-freedom’ or ‘under-
developed’ states, continue to reveal the limits of Western sovereignty and
expose the failure of modern governments to live up to their promises of bringing
security and justice to the world.
Western governments are permeated with assumptions vis-à-vis the prevalence
of freedom and democracy. These assumptions seem to be paradoxically and iron-
ically giving the right to some to categorise, criminalise, demonise, detain, expel
and exclude, whilst invoking virtues of fairness and tolerance: ‘We live in a country
which places great store on democracy, tolerance, fair play and freedom of
speech… We will set an annual limit to immigration, including a quota for asylum
seekers’ (Howard 2005). This enduring paradox which animates the political
discourse is indeed what reveals the hollowness of these claims (freedom and
democracy), which are, after all, mere figures of speech, ornaments hanging on the
politics of exclusion and regimes of domination. Such a paradox demands an inter-
ruption of these assumptions in order to rethink the question of immigration and
reconfigure the notion of otherness that dwells at the heart of political philosophy.
The ‘sense of panic’, as Cole (2000, p. 24) has it, concerning the issue of immi-
gration stems first and foremost from the tensions inherent in Western metaphys-
ics of subjectivity. These tensions are apparent in the ways in which the notion
of ‘the citizen’ is dialectically constructed as being both the universal (human
being) and the particular (individual belonging to a specific state), which accounts
for the concepts of freedom and individuality on the one hand and concepts of
membership and commonality on the other. However, while these notions of
universality and particularity are inextricably interwoven together within the
fabric of ‘citizen’, they are also perceived within the political imaginary as being
mutually exclusive (Coward 1999, p. 5). This synthetic separation legitimises the
order of sovereignty and gives rise to a myriad spatial partitions, all of which feed
into the politics of citizenship, in other words, the ‘politics of particularity’.
Central to this politics of particularity is the principle of inclusion (of good
particulars) and exclusion (of bad particulars) through which ‘the idea of norma-
tive universality’ (Zylinska 2004, p. 524) is established in relation to constitutive
particularity. Particularity in a sense could be understood as the partitioning of
differences and the demarcating of spatiality based on the ‘universal’ values of
autonomy and self-governing, manifested in the notion of statehood. The
production and formulation of the particular citizen within particular state is
initially performed through modes of inclusion and exclusion whereby individual,
communal and national identities are conceived of in terms of dichotomies of self
and other, of inside and outside, of belonging and alien, and so on. The state, as
such, represents itself as the locus par excellence of spatial particularity – terri-
toriality – through the politicisation of its borders, the principle by which the
concept of citizen is made possible. For without a state, the particular character
of the citizen dissolves into universality (being a human) and without citizens,
there could be no state (Coward 1999, p. 9). This interdependent relationship
between state and citizens is in fact what produces the spurious needs and
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rationalisation of division and containment which find their expression in the
ruling of sovereignty. Such a relationship also explains why each time the ques-
tion of immigration is raised by governments, there is a tendency to invoke the
notion of ‘people’ i.e. ‘citizens’ in order to substantiate the will to exclusion and
total enclosure, or what we may term ‘absolute particularity’: 
I think most people would agree that Britain has reached a turning point. They
know that our communities cannot successfully absorb newcomers at today’s
pace. (Howard 2005)
However, this absolute particularity, or at least the hysterical politics towards
which it is progressing, ignores that immigration controls (or indeed any form of
closure) are ‘like a dam; when one hole is blocked, another one appears somewhere
else’ (Hayter 2000, p. 152). This metaphor is illustrated through the practices of
‘alternative migration’ (so-called ‘clandestine’ migration), and all those whom,
to borrow Arendt’s expression, constitute the ‘the vanguard of their people’: those
who expose the ethical bankruptcy of Western politics, those who force open the
‘viscous spatio-temporal zone’ (Balibar 2002, p. 83) (i.e. the border), those who
refuse to succumb to the hindering of circulation imposed by rich countries, and
those, who of course, are forced into embarking on hostile journeys in order to
seek shelter or simply a better life. If such is the case, it is only because the world
is a porous place, a place made out of relations where ‘there has to be a clinamen[;]
… an inclination or an inclining from one toward the other, of one by the other,
or from one to the other’ (Nancy 1991, p. 3). Absolute particularity ignores this
logic of clinamen. It ignores the logic of relatedness. Instead, it lends itself to
‘absolute immanence’ whereby being-with, being-in-common, or in fact, being at
all, are understood as that of which is constituted through the organisation of
sameness (immanentist politics) or the sharing of common substance (immanen-
tist community). Such immanentist figurations function at the level of self (state/
demos)-enclosure, that is, the sealing of the inside from the outside by means of
a total separation from any ‘unwanted’ and ‘foreign’ element that might permeate
it. The politics of immigration stands as the quintessential example of such figures
of immanentism: ‘We will put in place 24-hour security at ports to prevent illegal
immigration… Taken together our proposals will lead to a substantial reduction in
the number of people settling in the UK’ (Howard 2005).
It is worth noting at this point that figures of immanentism- politics of immi-
gration in our case – are always presented as a project, in the guise of a work to
be accomplished (Nancy 1991), be it in terms of preserving the absolute separa-
tion, the mobilisation of technology to do so, or simply the perpetuation of the
mythical collectivised identity. At the level of absolute separation, the figure of
nation-state, as it were, is constructed as an autonomous and unified entity
whose ontological immanence is premised on sovereignty and self-sufficiency in
such a way that the need for exposure (the clinamen) is regarded as obsolete.
That is not to say, however, that the possibility of exposure is entirely eliminated
from such figure. Instead, exposure becomes that which relates to exteriority
only in terms of exchange value and flow of capital – in fact, this kind of exposure
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is encouraged as it sustains the doctrine of free market and perpetuates capital-
ism – as well as the emerging modes of measurement which are also applied on
human beings, such as quota for asylum seekers and points system for work
permits and residence. Nevertheless, measure here is not only the quantifying of
dimensionality (How many asylum seekers and immigrants should be let in?) –
although this is often presented in some political discourses as the salient point,
but more so, measure is the quantifying of ‘responsibility’ (Nancy 2000, p. 180)
so much so that the question becomes not only ‘how many?’ but ‘which?’ (Which
asylum seekers are ‘genuine’? Which asylum seekers should one be responsible
to? Which (skilled/needed) immigrants should be given the right to enter and
reside? Which marriages are not sham? In short, which ‘existences’ are deemed
worthy of living?). In such a context, measure becomes concurrently the embod-
iment of exposure as well as enclosure, both of which are, nonetheless, operated
within the intentionality of absolute separation.
Before extending my analysis any further, I would like, at this point, to return
to Nancy’s argument regarding absolute enclosure in order to discuss the impos-
sibility of absolute immanence and as such the non-viability of immigration
control. According to Nancy (1991, p. 4) ‘The logic of the absolute violates the
absolute’. This statement alludes to the dialectical logic by which Nancy seeks to
explain how individualism, that is, the absolute separation from the outside, is not
only impossible, but also, self-contradictory. Self-contradictory inasmuch as for a
separation to be ‘absolute’, it has to eradicate any contact with the outside by not
only closing around what it has to enclose (e.g. spatial particularity – territory –
which is yet exposed at its borders to another territory) but also, by closing around
itself: ‘The absolute must be the absolute of its own absoluteness, or not be at all…
to be absolutely alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must also be alone being
alone’ (Nancy 1991, p. 4). But this double move of closure, according to Nancy, is
self-contradictory. For when a closure closes around itself, it becomes that which
is closed rather than the closure as such. The absurdity of this will to absoluteness
may be illustrated here if we imagine how in order for a country to be absolutely
separated, it must have border controls of its own border controls! As such and
insofar as absolute separation is the predicate for absolute immanence, the latter
becomes merely an illusionary utopia fostered by immanentist politics whose aim
is to exclude all that which is not to be included in its immanentist state. The poli-
tics of immigration is in fact the realm where this utopia of immanentism finds its
expression. But despite the escalating efforts to bring this utopia into realisation,
governments are struggling in vain to control the freedom of movement for: 
Migrants and those who facilitate their migration resort to staggering feats of
ingenuity, courage and endurance to assert their right to move and to flee … The
question is how much suffering will be imposed on innocent people, and how
much racism will be stoked up… before governments finally abandon the effort.
(Hayter 2000, p. 152)
Let us now turn to the second aspect of the figuration of immanentism, technol-
ogy. The will to absolute separation rests upon the investment in technological
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apparatuses by which borders are controlled and bodies are scanned in order to
establish their (il)legitimacy. Several countries are increasingly developing and
implementing different modes of surveillance in order to measure, anticipate and
prevent any intrusion of unwanted individuals. Face-recognition, iris scanning,
fingerprinting, biometric cards, CCTV cameras in ports and detention centres,
are all examples of the technologies of surveillance through which governments
are expressing, implicitly if not explicitly, the imperative to administer and
manage life, and subsequently exercise ‘biopolitics’. Nevertheless, the biopoli-
tics of immigration is not only the management of life but also the management
of ‘a waiting-to-live, a non-life’ Balibar (2002, p. 83). For when technology inter-
acts with biology (with the aim to categorise and differentiate), it creates what
Foucault (2003 [1975], p. 255) calls ‘caesuras within the biological continuum
addressed by biopower’ so much so that the parameter of biological differentia-
tion and categorisation becomes the currency for life (of those who have legiti-
mate access – the belonging group, the healthy body), waiting-to-live (of those
whose files are still being processed by immigration officers or in the Home
Office),2 and non-life (of those whose cases failed and they are therefore subject
to deportation).3 The fact that technology is an aspect of immanentist biopoli-
tics, is in itself an attestation to how the political has faded into a state of tech-
nicism (Coward 1999, p. 18) – a depoliticisation of society in the Agambenian
sense – in which governments’ policies and debates are merely technical discus-
sions on the type of mechanisms to be deployed in order to protect borders, filter
movements, eliminate infiltrations, and ultimately, sustain sovereignty by means
of measurement and exclusion. Biopolitics, nowadays, is too pervasive, too subtle
that borders are no longer constituted around the ‘physical’ but actualised in the
taken-for-granted institutional-organisational-administrative processes; in the
density and ubiquity of information networks. This perpetual actualisation of
borders or what we may refer to as ‘infinite bordering’ is enacted into our very
ousia, creating far-reaching implications on ‘bodies that do not matter’, bodies
of those left to float in the Strait of Gibraltar, bodies of those left to die on the
US–Mexican border, bodies of those who are, at this very moment, being raped,
tortured and humiliated. Borders are becoming the epitome of Western hypoc-
risy: on the one hand, they embody visions of Western progress, civilisation and
technological advancements. On the other hand, they are turning into mass
graves, a monolithic disposal of dispensable bodies and unnecessary existences.
This is the dialectical reality of borders!
2.  They are either placed in detention centres where they are subjected to the gaze of constant
surveillance or released (rather ‘abandoned’) without being granted permission to work or access to
support. In most cases, they have to report to police stations on regular basis, while some even have
to carry an electronic tracking tag/biometric Smart Card.
3.  This category may also include ‘les sans-papiers’ [undocumented people] as well; people who
are living and working in constant anxiety and fear for not having the necessary residence or work
permits. They are hence forced to succumb to exploitation, cheap labour and harsh working condi-
tions. Les sans-papiers may also be included in the ‘waiting-to-live’ category – in fact, they keep
oscillating between the two.
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Moving onto the third aspect of the figuration of immanentism, we shall now
discuss the ways in which the mythical collectivised identity is brought into play
in order to justify, articulate and sustain the function of immanentism. The idea
of collective identity is bound to the idea of ‘common substance’ which, in the
immanentist discourse, is always represented as the essential bond between
people and the foundational character of common identity. Common substance,
as such, becomes the logic of institutionalisation in immanentist politics which
sees itself as the organiser and guarantor of common identity. Yet the realisation
of this communal identity takes place only at the level of ‘articulation’ (Nancy
1991) where the notion of ‘common substance’ is made ‘immanent’ to the idea
of communality so much so that, in immanentist political figurations, it is never
questioned but always taken-for-granted and perceived as ‘common sense’. And
to question common sense/common substance is to put at stake the very project
of absolute separation and expose the inside to the irreducible outside. Imma-
nentist politics, as such, performs its task of absolute enclosure by means of
suppressing/reducing difference, regulating alterity and securing its ‘imaginative
community’ (all being manifested in immigration controls). And when the other
is ‘needed’ (skilled migrants/ ‘Sector Based Scheme’ migrants) or imposed (having
to grant access to asylum seekers because of the signed international conventions),
there is a tendency to enforce modes of assimilation – what is called ‘integration’
– so that this Other is absorbed into a homogenous totality in which its ‘imagined’
disturbance/threat is reduced if not eliminated: ‘… hard work, determination and
a willingness to integrate propelled them [immigrants] forward… Britain has an
enviable record of racial integration’ (Howard 2005). Integration, in this sense,
becomes a work, an achievement to be extolled as the virtue of ‘good citizens’
and ‘good governments’, all, while invoking principles of common substance and
essential unity; ‘That’s what makes us so proud to be British’ (Howard 2005). ‘To
be British’ is, in fact, a testimony of how the myth of communal essence speaks
through the political enterprise of immanentism and renders identity as a project,
as the gathering together of absolute figures (citizens, states, institutions, commu-
nities, etc.) in order to naturalise the mythical character of collective identity;
absolute ‘being-such’ (Agamben 1993, p. 2) or absolute ‘suchness’:
He recounts to them their story, or his own … he is his own hero, and they, by
turns, are the heroes of the tale and the ones who have the right to hear it and
the duty to learn it. (Nancy 1991, pp. 43–4)
I come from an immigrant family…For centuries Britain has welcomed people
from around the world…Many of them came to Britain with almost nothing and
had to start again from scratch. (Howard 2005)
In myth, … existences are not offered in their singularity: but the characteristics
of particularity contribute to the system of the “exemplary life”. (Nancy 1991,
p. 78)
The enunciation of absolute suchness is only possible insofar as it relies on
mythic, inaugural figurations that circumscribe commonality in such a way that
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the ‘invention’, ‘recital’ and ‘transmission’ (Nancy 1991, p. 44) of myth become
the sole foundation of identity itself and the means by which absolute separation
is achieved. As such, one might compare political conferences, assemblies,
campaigns, etc. to a scene of gathering in which the myth is being recycled and
recited by telling stories about the genesis of absolute figures (citizens – includ-
ing the assimilated migrants, state, etc.), how they came to be together and how
they must protect their ‘origins’ and ‘communal essence’ from the intrusion of
the outsider (the ‘coming’ immigrant). In (political) speech, the articulation of
myth takes place when series of stories, shared values and beliefs are invoked in
an attempt to ennoble that speech (ibid., 48), substantiate immanentism and
present collective identity as an absolute figure whereby citizens and state are
situated within an enclosure. In such a process, myth transforms its mythic status
into a natural one to the extent that it is no longer perceived as a myth but
becomes the condition par excellence for belonging, politics or any other form
of ‘communitarian fulfilment’ (ibid., 69).
Thus far, we have seen how the figurations of immanentist politics are mani-
fested through immigration controls by means of spatialising, technologising and
articulating absolute figures within the political imaginary, giving rise to modes
of inclusion and exclusion. Such figurations are problematic insofar as they are
deeply ensconced within the determinism of sovereignty in which identity, citi-
zenship, and belonging are reduced to and burdened by the illusive belief in a
fixed common substance and a need to sustain a state of self-enclosure. To
follow the thread of Nancy’s assertions, it can be argued that what makes these
figurations rather problematic is, in fact, their failure to address or at least
recognise the question of what constitutes ‘being-in-common’ and their contin-
uous attempt to conceal the inevitability of ‘being-with’, notions that are salient
in rethinking the question of immigration.
Instead of regarding being-in-common as the gathering together of individuals
who share some common property or essence –and in which the clinamen is
removed from such gathering, Nancy (1991, p. 26–7) offers an alternative under-
standing of this concept. He asserts that being-in-common is first and foremost
being exposed to alterity through a relationship of sharing, made possible by the
Heideggerian notion of being-with (Mitsein) which goes beyond commonality and
identity politics. Such an understanding, albeit abstract due to its breaking away
from any spatial particularity, does indeed save individuals or rather singularities
from the danger of communal fusion (witnessed for instance in the movements
of fascism and Nazism) and the restraints of self-enclosure (immigration controls
for instance). For in Nancy’s conceptualisation, singular beings are not regarded
as absolute figures of immanentist politics (i.e. citizens) but as beings whose expe-
rience of being-in-common is constituted through their predicate-free existential/
ontological position of being-there (Dasein) and what they reveal to each other
in their exteriority (which forms their interiority) and their multiplicity (which
forms their uniqueness). The being-such of a singular being is irreducibly a being-
with that draws its sense of ‘selfness’ from the existence of ‘otherness’ without,
however, having to live up to a differentiating identity or a shared individuality
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that would place it within the confines of categorisation i.e. suchness: ‘such-and-
such being is reclaimed from its having this or that property … (the reds, the French,
the Muslims)’ (Agamben 1993, p. 1). Thus, the realisation or rather actualisation
of being-in-common is only possible insofar as singular beings are ‘whatever’
(ibid.) beings (not having any particular identity) whose ‘membership’ could not
be determined by or reduced to having/sharing ‘common’ characteristics. But a
membership that can only be experienced at the moment of exposure to singu-
larity, at the moment of its ‘taking place’ ‘…(which is itself without a place, with-
out a space reserved for or devoted to its presence)’ (Nancy 1991, p. 72). Exposure,
sharing and being-with are thus constitutive of being-in-common in such a way
that belonging itself becomes a ‘bare’ belonging stripped from any predetermined
condition of membership (Agamben 1993, p. 84) or demarcated territoriality. It
is a belonging where ‘whatever’ (singularity such as it is – and this ‘such’ is uniden-
tifiable and fluid) belongs to ‘whateverness’ (unconditional being-in-common).
Immigration, in this sense, can be regarded as an aspect of exposure, sharing and
being-with, to which there could/should be no fixed limit or neat bordering.
But while it might be objected that this conceptualisation of ‘being-in-common’
is devoid of any concrete ‘sense’ of political engagement or agency, it is, never-
theless, important to attend to the way in which such conceptualisation sets the
stage for the tensions inherent in the thinking of hospitality, which renders immi-
gration not only a political question but also an ethical one. For when the issue
of immigration is contemplated from an ethical standpoint, it becomes possible
to reveal not only the failure but also the ‘violence’ embedded within Western
politics (Metselaar 2003, p. 1). This political violence is epitomised in the policies
of detention, the treatment of refugees, the proposal of asylum quotas, the forced
integration, or even, the act of ‘naming’ (‘illegal immigrant’, ‘asylum seeker’,
‘refugee’, ‘bogus’, ‘detainee’, ‘deportee’, etc.), all of which breach the ethics
of radical generosity toward otherness – in that ‘violence does not consist so much
in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them
play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves’ (Levinas 1969, p. 21).
It is, hence, the call for ethics that puts the question of politics into doubt and
reconfigures the understanding of responsibility ‘for the Other’ (Levinas 1982,
p. 95), for the ‘Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself’ (Levinas
1969, p. 39)4.
4. The remaining part of this paper engages with the notions of responsibility and hospitality by
drawing on the philosophical writing of Levinas and Derrida. By juxtaposing Nancy’s critique of the
immanentist community and the insights offered by these two thinkers, it may be possible to read
Nancy-with-Derrida-with-Levinas in a way that makes the singularity of their ethico-political project
even more plural. This juxtaposition, nevertheless, requires one to take into account the differences
between these thinkers, whether in terms of conceptualisation or in terms of strategies by which they
seek to rethink, rework and ‘un-work’ concepts of community, identity and otherness. For instance,
whilst both Derrida and Nancy recognise the need to resort to the (Heideggarian-like) visual-symbolic
tactic of placing community under ‘erasure’ in order to remove it from its metaphysical determina-
tion, each of the two adopt a different approach for performing such an erasure: Derrida emphasising
on the movement of ‘crossing out’ the concept through the ‘deconstruction of fraternity’ while Nancy
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emphasising on the unavoidability of ‘writing’ the concept and the need for an ‘interruption of myth’
(see Morin 2006). In fact, the notion of ‘fraternity’ is one of the main markers of difference between
Derrida and Nancy’s approaches to the deconstruction of community. In Voyous (2003), for instance,
Derrida expresses his concern with Nancy’s ‘naked’ use of the term fraternity to name and determine
‘la communauté, le commun, le partage de la liberté ou l’égalité incommensurables de tout un
chacun’ (Derrida 2003, p. 85). For according to Derrida, the concept of fraternity is a process of iden-
tification and homogenisation through which modes of inclusion and exclusion are performed, and
aspects of difference are reduced and neutralised. Hence Derrida (pp. 87–8) asserts that: 
Fraternalisme, confrérie, communauté confraternelle et fraternisante, on y privilégie à la
fois l’autorité masculine du frère (qui est aussi un fils, un mari, un père), le généalogique,
le familial, la naissance, l’authochtonie et la nation … Alors pourquoi garder le mot de
fraternité plutôt qu’un autre ?
It is for these reasons that Derrida relentlessly calls for the continuous deconstruction of the figure
of the ‘brother’ and its embedded motives of affiliation and genealogy, especially ‘quand leur croise-
ment devient politique, quand on y politise un modèle, une figure, une hégémonie’ (ibid., p. 92). Yet
one may argue that even if Nancy does not seem to be as rigorously/explicitly critical in his own use
of the concept of fraternity and in his treatment of its transcendental dimension, his arguments vis-
à-vis the interruption of myth serve the very same function of deconstruction Derrida seeks to perform
and sustain (Morin 2006). For in interrupting the myth of communal origin and common substance, it
becomes possible to disrupt the continuity of mythical configuration (or ‘autofiguration’ as Nancy
(1991, p. 54) puts it) of nature and natural configuration of myth through the staging of myth itself,
which thereby deconstructs the myriad mythical figures – including that of the ‘brother’ – upon which
the notion of community is usually calibrated. (In Being Singular Plural, Nancy (2000, p. 198) does
indeed defend his position vis-à-vis the notion of fraternity: ‘I agree, then, with Jacques Derrida’s
critique of fraternity in his Politics of Friendship … But I must point out that I have also, on occasion,
raised the question of Christian fraternity. Moreover, I have reversed my position again and again on
the possibility of looking into whether fraternity is necessarily generic or congenital’).
The difference between Derrida and Nancy’s approach can also be seen in the way they concep-
tualise the notions of singularity, plurality and responsibility. For Derrida, responsibility is bound up
with the irreducible, isolated and inaccessible singularity in the sense that it relies on this secret
singular character – being alone and separated – at the moment of decision (Derrida 1995, p. 60).
And since tout autre est tout autre i.e. every other is every other and every other is ‘wholly’ other,
the relationship between the concept of responsibility and that of singularity leads to aporia and
paradox. This is insofar as the introduction of the plural (or the arrival of the ‘third’) brings about
the unavoidable sacrifice of other singularities in that one cannot possibly respond concurrently to
the call of all other others.
Contrary to Derrida, Nancy rejects the idea that singularities are isolated and remote. Instead, he
regards singularities as constantly being ‘exposed’ and ‘open’ to being-in-common – and therefore
always being responsible by virtue of one’s naked existence – so much so that what it is at stake for
him is not ‘how we might establish a bond between us, but rather … how it is that we have come to
consider ourselves separate in the first place’ (Edkins 2005, p. 383). It is also in this respect that
Nancy distinguishes the notion of the singular from the individual, for the latter is ‘merely the resi-
due of the experience of dissolution of community… the abstract result of a decomposition … abso-
lutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty’ (Nancy p. 1991, p. 3). Whereas
‘singularity never has the nature of the structure of individuality. Singularity never takes place at
the level of atoms, those identifiable if not identical identities; rather it takes place at the level of
the clinamen, which is unidentifiable’ (ibid., pp. 6–7). Thus for Nancy, Being is being-with, exist-
ence is coexistence, appearance is co-appearance, and the singular is indeed a plural (2000). Such
an ontological reconfiguration, according to Nancy, demands ‘a reconsideration of the very meaning
of “politics” – and therefore, of “philosophy” – in light of the originary situation: the bare exposition
of singular origins’ (Nancy 2000, p. 25). As such, ‘[w]hereas with Derrida we are led to consider
what binds us as singularities to other singularities, in Nancy our attention is directed rather to the
impossibility of being on our own’ (Edkins 2005, p. 383).
Nancy’s reasoning about this impossibility of being on our own stems partly from his rigorous
critique of what Hutchens (2005, p. 42) accurately calls ‘closed immanence’; a critique whose
premise is based upon the notion of ‘sense’. For Nancy (2003, p. 12), ‘[e]xistance is the sense of
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being’ and this sense of being is in fact our very exposure to the world at the edge of the world. Not
that the world and existence have a sense, but they are sense themeslves insofar as ‘the world is
not the work of a God… but the space of the ‘there is’, its configuration without a face’ (Nancy
1997, p. 156). Thus for Nancy, to speak of the sense of the world is only possible as far as one
presupposes the existence of an outside Creator, and once this presupposition collapses, what
remains is only the world as sense and sense as world. Here, Nancy is deconstructing the whole
concept of creation and origin found in the Christian discourse, and he does so by tearing the
concept away from ‘the forms of transcendence, exteriority or otherness often presented by reli-
gious thought’ (Hutchens 2005, p. 61) and placing it instead within the proposition that creation is
the ‘singular ex-position of being.. [it] is existence’ (Nancy 2000, p. 17). This rethinking of the world
and sense with and through sense remains very much in tune with the idea that being is irreducibly
being-with and that ‘[b]eing in touch with ourselves is what makes us “us,” and there is no other
secret to discover buried behind this very touching, behind the “with” of coexistence’ (ibid., p. 13).
The implications of Nancy’s rethinking of the world through sense carry over radically to his rethink-
ing of community through being-with, distinguishing his thesis from the levinassian articulations of
community (found for instance in Blanchot’s Unavowable Community). For instead of over-investing
in the alterity of the other or ‘exploring the possibility of a religiously accessible transcendence’
(Hutchens 2005, p. 44) as is the case with the ethical transcendentalism of Levinas, Nancy insists on
the idea that it is only through the experience of sharing and exposure at the edge of the world that
community can be rescued from the violence of closed immanence, that it is only through the inter-
twining of sense and being-in-common that resistance against communal fusion is possible. Seen in this
light, one may say that for Nancy, thinking beyond the dichotomy of immanence and transcendence
is first and foremost thinking sense; sense that is ‘coextensive with thinking as well’ (ibid., p. 61). And
it is this vision that may lead us to some of the points of disjuncture between Nancy and Levinas. For
in Levinassian terms, the notion of the Third is what ‘represents the possibility of the third direction
of a radical unconformity, which escapes the bipolar play of immanence and transcendence charac-
teristic of being’ (Caygill 2002, p. 146). Whereas, for Nancy, being(-in-common) is no third; ‘There is
no Me and You and a Third. Being-in-common stands for the fact that there is no inter’ (Devisch 2006,
p. 7). If everything ‘passes between us’, it is not that the ‘between’ is a bridge or a connection (some-
thing third) that links me to you, but rather; the between is ‘the stretching out [dimension] and
distance opened by the singular as such, as its spacing of meaning’ (Nancy 2000, p. 5).
Nancy’s rejection of the notion of the ‘third’ is mainly due to the latter’s designation as a surrogate
concept for ‘God’ or the ‘trace of the divine Other’ in Levinas’ thought. For Levinas, the beyond of
being is thirdness that is defined not in terms of alterity nor in terms of ipseity, but in terms of illeity.
As succinctly put by Caygill (2002, p. 147), illeity is ‘called at once to name the third mode of thought
between philosophy and religion, to epitomise Levinas’s critique of phenomenology, and to provoke
the most unrestrained version of his ethics, and in extremity even to serve as one of the names of God’.
So what binds one person to another, according to Levinas, is precisely the illeity of a God who passed
and whose trace is to be found in the ‘face’: ‘The face is for itself visitation and transcendence. But
the face completely open can at the same time be in itself because it is in the trace of illeity’ (Levinas
1981, p. 202). And it is for this reason that Levinas situates ethics in the ‘face-to-face’ relation. Nancy,
however, is very sceptical of such articulations insofar as they are embedded within the post-secular
thought in which the concept of God is understood and expressed in terms of: 
explosion, dispersal, suspension … as if “God” were in fragments, an Osiris dismembered
throughout all of our discourse [‘being’, ‘infinite’, ‘Other’, ‘community’, ‘poetry’, ‘art’,
‘sublime’, ‘love’, ‘desire’, etc.]… In baptising our abysses with the name of God, we are
guilty of at least two errors or two incoherencies: we fill in the abysses by attributing a
bottom to them, and we blaspheme (in the true sense of the word) the name of God by
making it the name of something. (Nancy 1991, pp. 112–3)
As such ‘[t]he temptation to find divinity “traced” in human experience, as if the god left a trace of
itself (or a “trace of a trace”) in passing (as in Levinas’s famous formula) is one that Nancy insists
must be avoided’ (Hutchens 2005, p. 93–4).
But despite the marked differences between Derrida, Nancy, and Levinas, reading them together
may prove more productive than reading them separately – especially in terms of the opening up of
a possible political space for rethinking the ethico-ontological question of community and being-with.
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In Levinasian ethics, responsibility does not exhaust itself in the ‘deed’; in what
one does for/to the Other5 (Levinas 1982, p. 96), but responsibility is primarily
the evocation of response entreated through the Other’s face, which allows one
to enter into an ethical relationship with otherness. As such, one is always and
inevitably responsible for the Other by virtue of his/her proximity to the ‘face’
of alterity which presents itself not so much in the measuring of spacing between
singularities but rather insofar as it brings the subject into existence through the
soliciting of speech and the embodiment of the relation of self to the Other. In
taking account of the face, the Other can no longer be abstracted into mere ‘grasp-
able’ categories of ‘possession’ (an asylum seeker, a refugee, a detainee, etc.)
but moves into a dimension of expression in which ‘the face resists possession,
resists my powers’ (Levinas 1969, p. 197) and, therefore, decentres subjectivity
(Campbell 1999, p. 33) and disturbs the will to ‘ignore’ this infinite responsibility.
Facial practices such as eyelid and lip sewing are illustrations of ‘This bond
between expression and responsibility’ (Levinas 1969, p. 200) by which some of
the ‘asylum seekers’ and ‘detainees’ assert their agency and make their ethical
call heard.6 But perceived from the vantage point of politics, the response to this
call would be merely that of obligation; the obligation to put an end to what is
perceived in the (Western) politics as a ‘barbarian blackmailing’ that stirs up the
anger of taxpayers (in other words, the ‘belonging’, ‘good’ citizens – absolute
figures). Whereas, from an ethical standpoint, the very manifestation of this help-
less plea would be in itself an attestation to the failure of politics – without which
the self-inflicted bodily harm would not have occurred in the first place – and a
demand for a response that goes beyond duty, morals and obligation i.e. a
response embedded within the ethics of absolute hospitality and pure generosity.
This disjuncture between the political totality and the ethical infinity marks
the abyssal hiatus between conditional (not only in the Kantian sense) and
unconditional hospitality (Derrida 2000). For conditional hospitality entails a
measuring of actions, a calculation of responsibility and a selection of those to
whom one may/should be hospitable/responsible. This is indeed the political
hospitality manifested, for instance, in what Cohen (2003, p. 72) calls
‘economic elitism’ found in the schemes of points system and work permits
which function by means of filtering those who may economically contribute
‘more to the public purse’ (Spencer, in Cohen 2003, p. 73) from those who have
‘little or nothing to contribute’ (Cohen 2003, p. 73). Added to that the current
‘Worker Registration Scheme’ in the United Kingdom relating to nationals of the
new European Union member states7 as well as the proposed quotas for asylum
5.  Following the translation of Levinas’ Totality and Infinity by Lingis, the ‘Other’ here refers to the
‘autrui’ (the personal Other, the you) whereas the ‘other’ refers to ‘autre’ (another person).
6.  For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between lip sewing, violence, politics, and the
concept of ‘penal asylum’, see Joseph Pugliese, ‘Penal Asylum: Refugees, Ethics, Hospitality’.,
http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol1no1_2002/pugliese.html.
7.  Since 1 May 2004, nationals of the new EU member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) who wish to work in the UK are required to apply under the Worker
Registration Scheme. It is only after working ‘legally’ for 12 months in the UK without a break that they
are entitled to have ‘full’ rights of free movement like nationals of the Western European countries.
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seekers. Ramifications of this political hospitality are damaging and violent in
that not only modes of discrimination, inequality and exclusion are systemati-
cally implemented, but also, the absolute responsibility for the Other is negated
and overridden by an exigency for reciprocity or a demand for repayment: ‘we
have offered a home to families who want to come here, work hard and make a
positive contribution to our society’ (Howard 2005). In contrast, unconditional
hospitality is a response to the ethical imperative which precedes the realm of
politics, philosophy and sociality. It is offered to anyone and everyone regard-
less of whether they are TB/HIV negative or not, whether they are skilled
migrants or not, whether they would contribute to the economy or not, whether
they would conform to the customs and values of the host entity or not. This
notion of hospitality entails a responsibility that has no limits, no particularity,
and an absolute openness to the Other that goes beyond any expectation, deter-
mination and knowledge. For ‘hospitality is…an experience which proceeds
beyond knowledge toward the other as absolute stranger, as unknown, where I
know that I know nothing of him’ (Derrida 2000, p. 8) – so much so that the
subject becomes not a host but a ‘hostage’ to the Other (Levinas in Derrida
2000, p. 9) with no choice but to be responsible and hence hospitable.
(However, this notion of being hostage to the Other is not to be regarded in
negative terms for it is the alterity of the other and his/her call that shape
one’s subjectivity, incite one to think, to feel (Diprose 2002, p. 134) and to be-
come). Thus, and to use Levinas’ (1981, p. 98) allegory, which is probably
derived from Nietzsche’s (1997, p. 91) ‘Ye love your virtue as a mother loveth
her child; but when did one hear of a mother wanting to be paid for her love?’,
the ethical relation of self (in our case, this would be the State) to the Other
becomes something akin to the relation of the mother to her foetus; an inevita-
ble and, at times, excessive responsibility for which nothing is necessarily
expected in return.
Nevertheless, ‘Everything that takes place “between us” concerns everyone’
(Levinas 1969, p. 212) and it is never a matter of one foetus only, one Other
solely, but a question of otherness in its entirety. As such, as soon as the ‘third’
party (another other) comes to the scene, this absolute ethical relationship
between self and Other is called into question, for the arrival of the Third compli-
cates the status of the Other as being the only object of ethical responsibility and
transfers this self-Other relationship into the political/juridical realm, and hence
conditionality so that responsibility could be calculated, portioned and allocated
‘accordingly’ (such operations tend to be value and interest-driven). As
mentioned earlier, it is the way in which conditionality functions by means of
institutionalising, organising, standardising and universalising relationships that
notions of singularity and alterity are betrayed and negated in the process of
legislation and (de)politicisation creating a ‘sociality that does not allow a gener-
osity that would foster … the improvement of survival of anyone other than those
bodies that already dominate’ (Diprose 2002, p. 171). Yet, this inevitable condi-
tionality trigged by the arrival of the third is what indicates that hospitality could
never be regarded merely form the vantage point of ethics (since in reality, the
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‘I’ does not engage solely with ‘one’ Other) but also in terms of politics (by virtue
of the arrival of the third who constitutes a multitude of others). Hospitality, in
this sense, is concurrently straddling the ethical as well as the political sphere
and in so doing, it reveals that ‘the determinability of this limit [between the
ethical and the political] was never pure and it never will be’ (Derrida in Diprose
2002, p. 186). This statement suggests that despite the apparent hiatus between
ethics and politics, there is no strict separation between the two after all, and
that the realisation of an ethico-political hospitality is possible only insofar as
one is willing to resolve or at least navigate the malleable bifurcation between
that which embodies calculable and conceptual practice (politics) and that which
embodies unconditionality and radical responsibility (ethics) without disposing of
one in favour of the other. Such an act will intrinsically necessitate the unwork-
ing (Nancy 1991) of immanentism in order to attend to an alternative politics
which takes ethics as its premise rather than absolute figurations of myth,
technicism and enclosure.
Although it is often argued that Levinas as well as Derrida’s unconditional hospi-
tability cannot be unproblematically (or even possibly) translated into a political
action (Metselaar 2003, p. 9) insofar as it is merely articulated at the level of the
dual self-Other relationship rather than sociality as a whole (this being particu-
larly true of Levinasian ethics), their vision is, nonetheless, salient in terms of
provoking a radical transformation in social and political imaginaries and invoking
the exigency of a ‘politics of generosity that would foster rather than close off
different ways of being’ (Diprose 2002, p. 172). Such politics will not proceed from
‘a hermeneutics of depth’ (Rose 1999, p. 196) in which subjectivity is wrought
around self-containment, self-sufficiency and self-determinacy, presented as a
project to be accomplished. Instead, it might find its point of departure in the
potential encounter with the other and the total exposure to embodied alterity.
For it is the experience of encountering and being-exposed-to that infuses the
crisis ‘into the hyphen at the heart of the nation-state’ (Coward 1999, p. 12) and
undoes any immanentist attempt to essentialise identity, commonality and
belonging. Whilst it is unclear as to how such an ethico-political vision may be
put into practice (perhaps this ‘not-knowing-how’ would save this alternative
vision from being turned into yet another figure of immanentism), it may be that
the rejection, transgression and obliteration of immigration controls are to be
regarded as the touchstone of this radical ethico-politics and an epitome of the
necessary shift from politics of borders to politics of singularities where ‘No One
Is Illegal’ (Cohen 2003).
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